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 ELD-025        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-1123 
___________ 
 
KEITH DOUGHERTY, Assignee of Bill’s Mechanical and  
Welding (Fictitious name) Sole Proprietor Larry Runk II,  
            Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CARLISLE TRANSPORTATION PRODUCTS, INC. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 1-13-cv-00857) 
District Judge:  Honorable J. Frederick Motz 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 30, 2015 
 
Before: RENDELL, SLOVITER and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 15, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Keith Dougherty appeals pro se from the District Court’s order denying  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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reconsideration of its entry of summary judgment in favor of Carlisle Transportation 
Products, Inc. (“Carlisle Transportation”).  We will affirm.  
I. 
 We previously found it necessary to characterize Dougherty as a “frequent and 
frequently vexatious litigator.”  In re Dougherty, 563 F. App’x 96, 97 (3d Cir. 2014) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 409 (2014) & 135 S. Ct. 426 (2014).  Dougherty is not a 
licensed attorney, and much of his previous litigation has involved his attempts to 
represent his business entities pro se in federal court.  See, e.g., Dougherty v. Snyder, 469 
F. App’x 71, 72-73 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam).  Dougherty also sometimes attempts to 
represent the interests and assert the claims of other individuals. 
 Larry Runk II is one such individual.  In this case, Dougherty asserts that Runk 
assigned to him a claim for $254,563.30 that Carlisle Transportation allegedly owes 
Runk’s company Bill’s Mechanical and Welding for unpaid repair work.  Dougherty filed 
suit against Carlisle Transportation seeking to recover the alleged debt as well as treble 
damages for Carlisle Transportation’s alleged fraud.1  Carlisle Transportation ultimately 
filed a motion for summary judgment raising, inter alia, the defense that the purported 
                                              
1 Dougherty filed suit under his own name and in the name of Keith Dougherty 
Investments & Consulting LLC.  By order entered March 21, 2014, the District Court 
dismissed all claims by the LLC because Dougherty alleged that he personally was the 
assignee of Runk’s claims.  Dougherty has not purported to appeal pro se on behalf of his 
LLC and has not otherwise challenged that ruling.  Unlike in the appeal at C.A. No. 15-
1271, which we address in a separate opinion, Runk himself was not a plaintiff in the 
District Court and is not an appellant on appeal. 
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assignment is invalid as champertous under Pennsylvania law.  The District Court agreed 
and entered judgment in favor of Carlisle Transportation for that reason.  The District 
Court later denied Dougherty’s motion for reconsideration, and Dougherty appeals from 
that ruling.2 
II. 
 The District Court did not explain in detail its conclusion that the purported 
assignment of Runk’s claim to Dougherty is champertous but, having conducted our 
plenary review, we agree.  Under Pennsylvania law, which no one disputes governs the 
assignment, “an arrangement offends public policy against champerty and is illegal if it 
provides for the institution of litigation by and at the expense of a person who, but for 
that agreement, has no interest in it, with the understanding that his reward is to be a 
share of whatever proceeds the litigation may yield.”  Kenrich Corp. v. Miller, 377 F.2d 
312, 314 (3d Cir. 1967) (applying Pennsylvania law in diversity and citing, inter alia, 
Richette v. Solomon, 187 A.2d 910 (Pa. 1963)).  “A plaintiff who sues on what would be 
                                              
2 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the entry of summary judgment is 
plenary.  See Rosano v. Twp. of Teaneck, 754 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2014).  Dougherty 
also challenges the District Court’s text-only denials of reconsideration and a post-
judgment motion for a preliminary injunction, which was in the nature of a motion for 
reconsideration as well.  We review de novo the District Court’s legal conclusions and 
review its ultimate decision to grant or deny reconsideration for abuse of discretion.  See 
Wiest v. Lynch, 710 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2013).  We perceive no abuse of discretion 
for the reasons explained herein.  Dougherty referred in his motion for a preliminary 
injunction to a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding but sought no specific relief in that 
regard.  We note that Dougherty’s most recent bankruptcy proceeding (M.D. Pa. Bankr. 
No. 1-14-bk-04781) was dismissed on December 30, 2014. 
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another’s claim except for such a champertous agreement will not be permitted to 
maintain an action.”  Id.   
 Though rarely invoked in recent times, “the common law doctrine of champerty 
remains a viable defense in Pennsylvania” and, “[u]nder Pennsylvania law, if an 
assignment is champertous, it is invalid.”  Frank v. TeWinkle, 45 A.3d 434, 438 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2012).  “An assignment is champertous when the party involved: (1) has no 
legitimate interest in the suit, but for the agreement; (2) expends his own money in 
prosecuting the suit; and (3) is entitled by the bargain to share in the proceeds of the suit.”  
Id. at 438-39. 
 Dougherty’s agreement with Runk is contained in the record (ECF No. 93-5), and 
it satisfies each of these elements.  First, Dougherty alleges that he purchased Runk’s 
claim in order to litigate it, and there is no indication that Dougherty has any personal 
interest in the dispute between Runk and Carlisle Transportation or has any dispute with 
Carlisle Transportation of his own.  Second, “[a]ppellant is using his own money to 
finance the suit[], as he is the pro se plaintiff and is therefore responsible for filing fees 
and other associated costs.”  Frank, 45 A.3d at 439.  The agreement provides that “Keith 
Dougherty will be responsible for any prepayment of fees as required” (ECF No. 93-5 at 
1), and Dougherty paid the docketing and filing fees in the District Court.  Finally, the 
agreement provides that Dougherty is entitled to “the sum of 1/3 of the sums Collected.”  
(Id.)  Thus, the assignment of this claim to Dougherty was champertous and Dougherty is 
not permitted to litigate it. 
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 Dougherty argues that he may do so under Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC 
Services, Inc., 554 U.S. 269 (2008).  In that case, the Court held that “an assignee of a 
legal claim for money owed has [Article III] standing to pursue that claim in federal 
court, even when the assignee has promised to remit the proceeds of the litigation to the 
assignor.”  Id. at 271.  The assignments at issue in that case were not champertous or 
otherwise invalid, however, and the Court addressed only Article III standing to assert a 
validly assigned claim, not the effect of a champertous agreement on the validity of an 
assignment.  For similar reasons, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has concluded that 
Sprint Communications does not affect Pennsylvania’s doctrine of champerty and that 
champerty “remains a valid defense in Pennsylvania.”  Frank, 45 A.3d at 440.  We 
predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would agree.  Dougherty certainly has 
standing to assert the validity of Runk’s assignment but, once the assignment is deemed 
invalid, Dougherty does not have standing to assert the underlying claim.  See Kenrich 
Corp., 377 F.2d at 314.3 
 One final matter requires discussion.  Dougherty has filed a motion requesting that  
                                              
3 Dougherty’s complaint in the related appeal at C.A. No. 14-4378, which we address in a 
separate opinion, suggests that Pennsylvania state courts already have rejected his 
assertion of claims purportedly assigned by Runk.  In that case, Dougherty alleged that 
state-court judges have refused to permit him to litigate other claims that Runk 
purportedly assigned to him under the same agreement (including the claim against Erie 
Insurance Exchange at issue in C.A. No. 15-1271), and he sought an injunction requiring 
the state courts to recognize the validity of those purported assignments.  We do not 
address whether these apparent judgments have preclusive effect in this proceeding, 
however, because Carlisle Transportation has not raised the issue and the record on 
appeal does not permit its resolution.  
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(1) this appeal and No. 15-1271 be assigned to different panels and (2) the Court either 
reveal the composition of those panels in advance or transfer these appeals to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.  Dougherty cites 28 U.S.C. §§ 46(b) 
and 2077, but those statutes are plainly inapposite to his requests and there is otherwise 
no basis for them.4  Of less concern to us than the substance of this motion, however, is 
its tone.  The motion is rife with vituperative attacks on the integrity of this Court and, 
more disturbingly, apparent threats of lethal violence if this Court denies his requests.  
We will not dignify Dougherty’s specific comments by repeating them here.  We 
previously cautioned Dougherty that we might consider imposing sanctions if he persists 
in filing documents in closed cases.  See In re Dougherty, 563 F. App’x at 98.  We now 
caution him that future threatening and abusive filings of this nature may subject him to 
sanctions as well.  Such sanctions may include a substantial monetary penalty. 
III. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  In doing so, 
we hold only that the purported assignment at issue here is invalid for purposes of 
Dougherty’s ability to assert Runk’s claim in court, and we express no opinion on the 
validity of the assignment for other purposes or on any rights or obligations of Dougherty 
and Runk as between themselves.  Dougherty’s motions pending in this Court are denied.
                                              
4 For Dougherty’s benefit, we note that we are considering the appeals together for 
purposes of efficiency given their related background and overlapping issues. 
